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A WORLD WITHOUT COLOR: THE CALIFORNIA
CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE AND THE FUTURE
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Con-
stitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any
public authority to know the race of those entitled to be
protected in the employment of such rights.
... There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows, nor tolerates classes among citizens.!
One hundred years after Justice Harlan drafted his fa-
mous Plessy v. Ferguson2 dissent, Californians voted to incor-
porate his ideas into their State Constitution.3 The Califor-
nia Civil Rights Initiative ("CCRI' or "Initiative"), or
Proposition 209 as it was referred to on the ballot, passed by
a slim majority in the November 1996 election.' The Initia-
tive is the first state-wide ban of all racial, ethnic, and gen-
der-based preferences in state employment, education, and
contracting in the history of affirmative action.5 As a result
of its passage, all state-sponsored affirmative action pro-
grams have been eliminated.6 Women and minorities may no
longer be targeted by employment or educational recruiters,
nor may they receive any economic or social benefits solely
because of their gender or race.7 As a result, California has
truly become color and gender blind.
The passage of CCRI has sparked a tremendous amount
of controversy both in California and throughout the rest of
the United States.8 To many, the Initiative is merely an af-
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (holding
that laws which discriminate on the basis of race are Constitutional so long as
the states proffered separate but equal treatment).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal.
1996), vacated by Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22955 (Aug.
21, 1997), cert. denied, No. 97-369, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6506 (Nov. 3, 1997).
4. Coalition, 946 F. Supp. at 1488.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1489
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., James Kilpatrick, Courts Will Decide Preferences, MONT-
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firmation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.9 To these supporters of CCRI, the Initiative stands
for the proposition that all persons should be treated equally,
regardless of color, gender, or national origin." Others, how-
ever, believe that CCRI goes too far by eliminating programs
designed to help victims of past and present discrimination."
The opponents of CCRI gained an early victory in De-
cember 1996 when a California district court granted a pre-
liminary injunction against the enforcement and implemen-
tation of the Initiative. 2 However, this victory was short
lived. In 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
injunction and declared that the Initiative did not violate the
U.S. Constitution. 3 The Coalition for Economic Equality
("Coalition") filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court on August 29, 1997.4 How-
ever, on November 3, 1997, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari to the petitioners. 5 Thus, the Supreme
Court has passed up the opportunity to sort out the legal am-
biguities that still exist with respect to the Initiative. 6
While the Ninth Circuit opinion upholding the constitu-
tionality of Proposition 209 remains intact, there are still
many unanswered questions about how to promote diversity
and combat the discrimination that exists in our society, or at
least in California state educational and employment sectors.
This comment seeks to explore the ramifications of the Cali-
fornia Civil Rights Initiative on American minorities in Cali-
fornia. 7 It also attempts to examine the legitimate legal
GOMERY (AL) ADVERTISER, Jan. 13, 1997, at 6A.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
13. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22955 (Aug. 21, 1997) (amending opinion originally reported at
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6512 (Apr. 8, 1997) (forthcoming reporter publication at
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
14. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22955 (Aug. 21, 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3181
(U.S. Aug. 29, 1997) (No. 97-369).
15. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. 97-369, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6506
(Nov. 3, 1997) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
16. Silence of the Court on Affirmative Action, S.F. CHRON., November 4,
1997, at A20, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sfchrn File.
17. See infra discussion Part IV.A.
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challenges raised by Proposition 209 opponents, 8 and offers
alternative means to promote diversity and distributive jus-
tice."9 The hope is that close scrutiny of the Initiative will
persuade readers that, while alterations in affirmative action
programs might be necessary, the complete abolishment of
such a system will only perpetuate the problems associated
with past unfair treatment of women and minorities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Affirmative Action
1. Executive and Legislative History
The turbulent history of affirmative action is often said
to begin with President Roosevelt's 1941 Executive Order
which required the federal government, as an employer, to
take "affirmative action" not to discriminate against any
worker on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.0
Although this was technically only a wartime effort to in-
crease minority employment, it paved the way for similar fu-
ture executive orders." Both Presidents Truman and Eisen-
hower, for example, issued similar orders while in office, in
response to Congress' refusal to codify Roosevelt's policy.22
However, it was President Kennedy who was finally able
to convince Congress that progress in civil rights was impos-
sible without legislative action.23 In a 1963 formal Congres-
sional address," Kennedy implored Congress to pass legisla-
18. See infra discussion Part IV.B.1.
19. See infra discussion Part V.A.
20. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A CONFLICT OF RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 16 (1991). In addition to prohibiting the federal govern-
ment from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin,
the Executive Order also applied to holders of defense contracts. Id. Similarly,
it created the Fair Employment Practices Commission to look into discrimina-
tion charges. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 17. In addition to persuading Congress to take action, President
Kennedy was also responsible for the issuance of Executive Order 10925, which
established the Presidential Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity,
and mandated that all federal contractors not discriminate against employees
on the basis of race. UROFSKY, supra note 20, at 17.
24. Kennedy's interest in persuading Congress to take action was intensi-
fied by events in Birmingham, Alabama and the march in Washington.
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tion aimed at the elimination of the economic disparity be-
tween Blacks and Whites in America. 5 He believed that the
rights to vote, to have access to public facilities, and to be
free of discrimination were meaningless to unemployed
Blacks. Thus, he stressed the importance of creating legisla-
tion that increased job opportunities for minorities.26 As he
explained, "[there is little value in a Negro's obtaining the
right to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no
cash in his pocket and no job."27
In response, Congress passed Titles VI and VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.28 Title VI of the Act prohibits feder-
ally-funded institutions from discriminating on the basis of
race.29 To ensure the statute's effectiveness in federal courts,
the language of Title VI specifically nullifies the Eleventh
Amendment immunity typically afforded states for statutory
violations." Title VI applies largely to racial discrimination
in the educational context."
Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race.32
At the time of its passage, Title VII was seen by many sup-
porters as the most effective means by which to eliminate the
great economic disparities between blacks and whites.33 As
Senator Clark, Democrat of Pennsylvania, explained,
"[e]conomics is at the heart of the racial situation. The Negro
has been condemned to poverty because of a lack of equal job
opportunities. This poverty has kept the Negro out of the
KATHANNE W. GREENE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE 22
(1989).
25. President John F. Kennedy, Address before U.S. Congress (June 1963),
109 CONG. REC. 11,177-11,178 (1963). In his congressional address, Kennedy
cited statistics tending to show that blacks were two times as likely as whites to
be unemployed. Id. He considered this disparity to be the result of socio-
economic factors-not just discrimination in employment. Id.
26. GREENE, supra note 24.
27. President John F. Kennedy, Address before U.S. Congress (June, 1963),
109 CONG. REC. 11,177-11,178 (1963).
28. See U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994); see also U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994).
31. Stephen R. McAllister, Controversial Decisions of the 1994-95 Supreme
Court Term: One Anglo-Irish American's Observations on Affirmative Action, 5
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 21, 24 (1996).
32. See U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994); see also U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).
33. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,075-80 (1964).
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mainstream of American life."34 As a result, the remedies af-
forded by Title VII include punitive damages, compensatory
damages, attorneys fees, and reinstatement.35
In an attempt to promptly execute the Civil Rights Act of
1964, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246,36
which renewed Kennedy's mandate that federal contractors
take "affirmative action to recruit, hire, and promote more
minorities."37 In addition, Johnson's Order delegated all en-
forcement responsibilities to the Civil Service Commission
and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs.38
Despite Johnson's executive efforts, affirmative action
did not have a major impact on hiring policies until after
President Nixon took office in 1969."9 In 1971, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights issued a shocking annual report
on the impact of the Civil Rights Act on equality. ° It re-
ported that "[d]espite these provisions against employment
discrimination, the problem of unequal opportunity remains
severe ... while there has been some overall minority em-
ployment gains in the general private labor market, dis-
crimination remains largely unabated [six] years after Con-
gress ordained equal employment opportunity as organic
law."41  In response, President Nixon issued the "Nixon
Plan,"42 which supplemented President Johnson's Order by
requiring annual affirmative action plans from major con-
tractors, including well-defined numerical hiring goals and
34. 110 CONG. REC. 13,080 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994); see also § 2000e-5(g) (1994); § 2000e-5(k)
(1994). These remedies were also included in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
36. UROFSKY, supra note 20, at 16.
37. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 11,246, 5 C.F.R. 900.404 (1964)). Women
were added to the definition of "minorities" two years later, in Executive Order
11,375. Id.
38. GREENE, supra note 24, at 44. The Civil Service Commission is now the
Office of Personnel Management. Id.
39. UROFSKY, supra note 20, at 18.
40. GREENE, supra note 24, at 44.
41. Id. The report also identified several problems with the Civil Rights Act
which hampered the effectiveness of its implementation. Id. Among them were
the government's failure to formally define "affirmative action," to come up with
adequate enforcement procedures, to use the available sanctions, and to collect
proper racial data. Id. at 45. In addition, the report suggested that implemen-
tation of the Civil Rights Act required a larger staff and more resources than
the government had previously allotted. Id.
42. See Office of Federal Contract Compliance Revised Order No. 4, 41
C.F.R. 60-2.1 (1971).
2391997]
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timetables to assist in enforcement. 4 The plan was quickly
adopted as a standard for review by federal judges who used
it to gage the progress of public employers." It also caught
the attention of private employers who slowly began to ex-
amine their hiring practices and to change their policies.45
In the years that followed the inception of the Nixon
Plan, people began to have different ideas about how and
when affirmative action programs should be implemented,
blurring the definition of affirmative action.46 While some
people argued that affirmative action programs should be
used as a remedy for all past discrimination, others claimed
that they should only be used in cases of present, intentional
discrimination.47 Still others maintained that race and gen-
der-based preferences have no societal merit whatsoever and
should be abolished." As a result, today there are wide-
spread disagreements about the meaning of affirmative ac-
tion-both in and out of the courts.49 In the broadest terms,
and for the purposes of this comment, "affirmative action"
may be said to refer to any program that actively seeks to in-
crease minority representation in the workforce, education,
or governmental contracting. °
2. The Constitutionality of Affirmative Action
Following the implementation of the Nixon Plan,51 the
courts were flooded with litigation challenging the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action programs." The litigation pri-
43. UROFSKY, supra note 20, at 18. The plan was intended by Nixon and
his Assistant Secretary of Labor, Art Fletcher, as a means by which to bring
minorities into mostly white trades. Id.
44. Id. at 19.
45. Id.
46. Winston Riddick, Overview of U.S. Supreme Court Affirmative Action
Decisions in Race and Gender Cases, 23 S.U. L. REV. 107, 108 (1996).
47. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Riddick, supra note 46, at 108.
50. Id.
51. See Office of Federal Contract Compliance Revised Order No. 4, 41
C.F.R. 60-2.1 (1971).
52. McAllister, supra note 31, at 21-22. Constitutional challenges to af-
firmative action only affect government-sponsored programs, since the Fifth
Amendment applies to the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies to the states. Id. The Supreme Court's rulings do not apply to
240 [Vol. 38
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marily focused on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment princi-
ples of due process and equal protection.53 According to the
Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." 4 It was ratified in 1868, with the post-civil
war intent that "[wihatever law protects the white man shall
afford equal protection to the black man."55 Moreover, it was
not originally meant to be a "source of rights," but merely a
blanket prohibition on state-created rights or immunities
that specifically discriminated against its citizens on the ba-
sis of race. 6 Through time, however, equal protection juris-
prudence has strayed from the narrow intent of the framers,
to the point where it has become "the basis for challenging of-
ficial racial discrimination"57 and state imposed affirmative
action programs."
a. Case Law
The Supreme Court first dealt with the relationship be-
tween affirmative action and the Fourteenth Amendment in
Regents of University of California v. Bakke." In Bakke the
Court examined a preferential admissions program utilized
by the University of California at Davis Medical School.6"
The respondent, a white male, argued that by setting aside a
certain number of positions in the entering class for minority
students, the University had violated both the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution and Title VI of the Civil
privately mandated programs. Id.
53. Id. The Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth, applies to cases against
the federal government. Id. The Fifth Amendment prohibits deprivation of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
55. DONALD E. LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE 51 (1992) (quoting
CONG. GLOBE 474, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (quoting Rep. Stevens)
(emphasis in original).
56. Id. Despite the original intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment,
modern cases have interpreted it to include many "fundamental rights" not
specified in the Constitution. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment implies a right to privacy in
matters of contraception between married people).
57. LIVELY, supra note 55, at 58 n.50.
58. Id. at 141.
59. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60. Id. at 265.
1997]
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Rights Act of 1964.61 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, agreed, but
held that, although the state may not base admission deci-
sions solely on skin color, it does have a constitutional
"interest that legitimately may be served by a properly de-
vised admissions program involving the competitive consid-
eration of race and ethnic origin."62
Two years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,63 the Court ex-
amined the constitutionality of a congressional statute re-
quiring federally funded public works projects to employ mi-
nority subcontractors for ten percent of all subcontractor
work.6 4 The Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the stat-
ute was constitutional.65 In support, the Court emphasized
the facts that the congressional statute included provisions
which permitted waiver of the set-aside requirement in some
cases, and that section five of the Fourteenth Amendment is
broad enough to encompass set asides such as this.66 In his
concurrence, Justice Marshall opined that the proper test for
determining the constitutionality of an affirmative action
program should be whether it serves an important govern-
mental purpose, and is the appropriate means by which that
purpose can be achieved.67
After Fullilove, the Court became less sympathetic to-
ward affirmative action programs. In its 1985 decision, Wy-
gant v. Jackson Board of Education, for example, the Court
sustained a challenge to an affirmative action program that
gave minority teachers preference in layoff procedures.68 The
policy at issue had been adopted by the Board of Education
only after extensive collective bargaining, and was a response
to a plethora of racial problems plaguing the school system."
Nonetheless, the Court, in a plurality opinion, held that de-
spite its efforts to alleviate racial tension, the Jackson Board
of Education policy was unconstitutional. Absent "some
61. Id. at 277-78.
62. Id. at 320.
63. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
64. Id. at 456-92.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 476-78, 486-89.
67. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 276.
242 [Vol. 38
WORLD WITHOUT COLOR
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit in-
volved," the policy was bound by the Fourteenth Amendment
to be racially neutral.7'1 The Court also held that the program
placed an undue burden on non-minority teachers, and thus
independently violated the Equal Protection Clause.72
Four years later, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.," the Court established a concrete standard for review in
affirmative action cases. At issue was a Richmond, Virginia
affirmative action program that set aside thirty percent of
employment for minority subcontractors. 4 The program had
been based on congressional findings of nationwide racial
discrimination in the area of construction,75 and on the exis-
tence of the congressional policy upheld in Fullilove.6 De-
spite the similarities between the two statutes, the Court dis-
tinguished Fullilove by holding, for the first time, that the
proper standard for review in state or local government pro-
grams is strict scrutiny.77 Thus, unless the state or local gov-
ernment program (1) serves a compelling governmental in-
terest, and (2) is narrowly tailored to meet that interest, it is
unconstitutional.78 With regard to the facts of Richmond, the
Court found that "governmental interest" cannot be derived
from proof of past nationwide discrimination.79 Instead, proof
of local discriminatory practices is required. Since the city
failed to offer such proof, the ordinance was held invalid."
The Croson holding was limited in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC,8' when the Court refused to extend the strict
71. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). According to
Justice Powell, affirmative action programs must be prefaced by an actual
showing of "sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been
prior discrimination." Id. Such evidence was said to ensure that new racial
distinctions are not created. Id. at 277-78.
72. Id. at 276.
73. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
74. Id. at 712-14.
75. Id. at 714.
76. Id. at 712-14. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.a.
77. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Since the
statute at issue in Fulilove was congressionally mandated, it was not affected
by this holding. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
78. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-506.
79. Id. at 500-04.
80. Id. At 506.
81. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
1997]
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scrutiny test to federal affirmative action programs.82 In
Metro Broadcasting, the Court upheld two federally
prompted affirmative action policies designed to favor mi-
nority broadcast firms.83 The first awarded special prefer-
ences to minority owners applying for new broadcasting li-
censes.84  The second gave preference to minority owners
seeking broadcast licenses in distress situations.85 The Court
felt that since Congress had not only approved these meas-
ures, but had, in fact, mandated them, a lower standard of
review in federal affirmative action program cases was justi-
fied.8" As such, it adopted the test proffered by Justice Mar-
shall in his Fullilove concurrence: so long as an affirmative
action program (1) serves "important governmental objec-
tives," and (2) the means chosen are closely related to that
purpose, the program is constitutional.87 In addition, the
Court held that "important governmental objectives" include
benefits of broadcast diversity, and, thus, are not limited to
proof of past discrimination.88
Five years later, the Court changed its mind. In Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,89 it held that despite the
Metro Broadcasting holding, a constitutional standard of
strict scrutiny is appropriate for review of affirmative action
programs at both the federal and state level. ° At issue in
Adarand was a Small Business Association program which
gave contractors on federally funded projects significant fi-
nancial incentives to employ socially and economically disad-
vantaged subcontractors.9 In particular, the program re-
quired contractors to "presume that socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, His-
panic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Ameri-
cans, and other minorities. ... ,,92 Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor expressed the belief that prior cases had es-
82. Id. at 577-99.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 577-78.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 577-99.
87. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
88. Id.
89. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 497 U.S. 200 (1995).
90. Id. at 224.
91. Id. at 205-06.
92. Id. at 205 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(2)).
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tablished that these racial classifications elicited skepticism,
consistency, and congruence.93 Thus, to the extent that Metro
Broadcasting permitted a less strict test for federally man-
dated programs, it was overruled. '
While the Adarand test makes it exceedingly difficult to
draft a constitutional affirmative action program, the Court
was careful to point out that such programs are not impossi-
ble.95 So long as the government demonstrates (1) a compel-
ling interest that can be served only by affirmative action,
and (2) that the affirmative action program selected is the
most appropriate means to the fulfillment of that interest,
the program will be found constitutional.96
B. The California Civil Rights Initiative
1. Passage and Implementation
California's response to the controversy surrounding the
issue of affirmative action was the November 1996 passage of
Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative
("CCRI").97 CCRI amends Article I of the California State
Constitution by adding section 31, which states: "[tihe state
shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treat-
ment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting."98 The
term "state" is broadly defined by section 31(f) to include "the
state itself, any city, county, city and county, public univer-
sity system, including University of California, community
93. Id. at 223.
94. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 497 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
95. Id. 237
96. Id. at 235.
97. Karen Brandon, Affirmative Action Ban Sparks Suit: ACLU says Cali-
fornia Measure is Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1996, at A24. The Cali-
fornia Civil Rights Initiative was passed by a slim 54% to 46% margin in the
November 5, 1996 election. Id. It was drafted by supporters of California As-
semblyman, Bernie Richter (R-Chico), who introduced similar bills to the state
legislature in 1994 and 1995. A.G. Block, Ballot of Propositions, CALIF.
JOURNAL BALLOT BOOK, Sept. 1996. It follows the recent abolishment of af-
firmative action in the University of California system, and is supported by
California Governor Pete Wilson and California Attorney General Dan Lun-
gren. Id.
98. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (amended 1996).
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college district, school district, special district, or any other
political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or
within the state."99
The language of CCRI suggests that it was intended not
to protect any particular racial, gender, or ethnic group, but
to eliminate some of the protection already afforded minori-
ties and women under previous affirmative action laws.'0°
Opponents of the measure0 ' argue that in addition to elimi-
nating obvious gender and race based preferences in both the
professional and educational arenas, CCRI will also pro-
foundly effect recruiting, scholarship, and educational pro-
grams which target minorities and women. 102 For example, it
is expected that CCRI will put an end to such programs as
the University of California Mathematics, Engineering and
Science Achievement ("MESA") mentoring program, which
specifically targets women and minority students for future
careers in the math and science fields.0 3
Similarly, opponents argue that voluntary school deseg-
regation programs, such as bussing and remediation efforts,
will most likely be eliminated, as will dozens of government
and privately endowed scholarship funds that take race and
gender into account.0 4 At the University of California at
Berkeley alone, it is estimated that $28 million in financial
aid programs will have to be cut-$7 million of which stems
from private funds targeted at such groups as Portuguese
men and women.'
Opponents of Proposition 209 also claim that multicul-
tural programs and classes at public schools will also greatly
suffer, as they "give preferential treatment" to minority cul-
tures and interests by allocating government funds to
them.106 According to these opponents, the initiative could,
99. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(f) (amended 1996).
100. Bettina Boxall, California and the West, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at
A3.
101. Opponents of CCRI include civil-rights activist Rosa Parks, Los Angeles
Mayor, Richard Riordan, the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and President
of the League of Women Voters, Fran Packard. A.G. Block, Ballot of Proposi-
tions, CALIF. JOURNAL BALLOT BOOK, Sept. 1996.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. A.G. Block, Ballot of Propositions, CALIF. JOURNAL BALLOT BOOK, Sept.
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therefore, be found to prohibit the teaching of African Ameri-
can culture, or Women's Studies; and, it may force public
educators and government officials to disregard the obser-
vance of such holidays as St. Patrick's Day.
10 7
While supporters of CCRI. °8 acknowledge the breadth of
the effects it will have on Californians, they claim that it is
not inconsistent with the Civil Rights movement of the
1960's, and that its passage is necessary to reaffirm Justice
Harlan's vision of a color-blind Constitution.1 9 The belief is
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to end all ra-
cial discrimination-to make it unlawful to judge someone or
place inherent value on the color of his or her skin or gen-
der.11° Instead of fulfilling this goal, however, CCRI propo-
nents argue that the Act has been corrupted to the point
where government imposed preferences, quotas, and set-
asides have become no more than forms of legalized reverse
discrimination.' Proponents of CCRI claim that it is time to
acknowledge the failure of affirmative action, and the injus-
tice it has created for Caucasians throughout America.112 As
one supporter put it,
Our national and state governments must never again
permit discrimination by race, ethnicity or gender; they
must protect the right of equal opportunity for all. Our
governments of late have failed us in this fundamental re-
sponsibility by permitting special privileges to be granted
to some groups at the expense of others. The legacy of this
is found in the intensifying balkanization of our country in
the name of "diversity" and expansion of the social pathol-
ogy called multiculturalism.... The California Civil
Rights Initiative will go a long way toward reestablishing
a colorblind society and a more level playing field, with
goal posts available to all.
113
1996.
107. Id.
108. Supporters of CCRI include California Governor Pete Wilson, State At-
torney General Dan Lungren, Stanford University professor Glynn Custred,
and State Senator Quentin Kopp (I-San Francisco). A.G. Block, Ballot of
Propositions, CALIF. JOURNAL BALLOT BOOK, Sept. 1996; see also supra note 97.
109. John E. Swett, Proposition 209's Political Fallout, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1996, at B7.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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2. Constitutional Issues
The debate over Proposition 209 does not end with the
public policy concerns outlined above. Proponents and oppo-
nents of CCRI have, in fact, extended the debate to the legal
arena. On November 6, 1996, only a day after CCRI was
passed, a group of civil rights advocates filed suit in federal
court alleging that Proposition 209 violates both the Four-
teenth Amendment"' and the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. 15 Plaintiffs include the Coalition
for Economic Equity, the California National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), several
groups representing the interests of women and minority-
owned businesses, and several persons adversely affected by
the initiative."6 Among the named defendants are California
Governor Pete Wilson, Attorney General Dan Lungren, sev-
eral California counties and cities, and many state officials."17
On November 27, 1996, in Coalition for Economic Equity
v. Wilson, Chief U.S. District Court Judge Thelton Henderson
granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining or-
der. He also certified as a class of plaintiffs "all persons or
entities who on account of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or na-
tional origin, are or will be adversely affected by Proposition
209." The restraining order prohibited the defendants from
implementing CCRI pending a hearing on a preliminary in-
junction.
On December 23, 1996, Judge Henderson issued a pre-
liminary injunction. As a result, defendants were enjoined
from "implementing and enforcing proposition 209 insofar as
said amendment to the Constitution of the State of California
purports to prohibit or affect affirmative action programs in
public employment, public education, or public contracting,"
114. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (N.D. Cal.
1996). Plaintiffs argued that Proposition 209 violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by making it much more difficult for women and minorities to achieve
legislation in their favor than it would be for any other group to do the same.
Id.
115. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that CCRI violates the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution by interfering with "[clongressional goals embodie[d] in Titles
VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972." Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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pending final judgment in the action.118
In his sixty-seven page ruling, Judge Henderson agreed
with plaintiffs' contention that Proposition 209 violates the
Fourteenth Amendment by making it much harder for
women and minorities to implement race- and gender-based
programs aimed at remedying present discrimination than it
is for all other groups to achieve favorable legislation."9 As
Judge Henderson pointed out, prior to the passage of Propo-
sition 209, women and minorities who desired to implement
race- or gender-based affirmative action programs "were able
to petition their state and local officials directly"'' ° in much
the same way as anyone else seeking preferential treatment
would.' As a result of CCRI, however, proponents of af-
firmative action programs are no longer able to seek political
assistance in this way. 2 Instead, they must first face the dif-
ficult task of amending the California Constitution so as to
permit an appropriate affirmative action program. 12 As a re-
sult, Judge Henderson argued that minorities and women are
effectively precluded from "petitioning local and state policy-
makers and representatives to adopt, maintain, or expand
race- or gender-conscious affirmative action programs.""4
In contrast, all other gender- and race-neutral groups
that wish to achieve similar preferential legislation in the ar-
eas of government contracting, employment, or education are
not affected by the passage of Proposition 209.12 A group of
disabled contractors, for example, can still effectively secure
118. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1521 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
119. Id. at 1491.
120. Id. at 1499.
121. Id. at 1498. "Such programs can generally be approved by simple ma-
jority vote, or by executive decision." Id.
122. Id. at 1499.
123. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1498 (N.D. Cal.
1996). Amending the California State Constitution necessitates either an ini-
tiative amendment, which requires sponsors to collect the signatures of at least
eight percent of the number of people voting in the last gubernatorial election
and then gain majority approval by voters, or a legislative amendment, which
requires a two-thirds vote by both California's Senate and Assembly. Id. In
addition to being a very time-consuming process, amending the state constitu-
tion is also a very expensive task. Id. In the 1990 election, for example, over
$109 million was spent on statewide initiatives alone. Id.
124. Id. at 1499.
125. Id. at 1505.
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legislation which would set aside a certain number of gov-
ernment contracts for use by similar disabled contractors,
without interference by CCRI. 126 Unlike women and minori-
ties, they do not have to amend the state Constitution prior
to petitioning the appropriate state or local government offi-
cials.'27 As Judge Henderson articulated, such a discrepancy
demonstrates that despite Proposition 209's facially-neutral
language, 128 the effect of its implementation is the imposition
of a heavy burden on only a select portion of the state popula-
tion-women and minorities.'29
In coming to these conclusions of law, Judge Henderson
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decisions in Washing-
ton v. Seattle School District No. 1,130 and Hunter v. Erik-
son."' In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the
Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as a guarantee
of "the right to full participation in the political life of the
community."'32 In so doing, the Court invalidated a Washing-
ton state initiative ("Initiative 350") that prohibited school
boards "from requiring any student to attend a school other
than the one geographically nearest or next nearest to the
student's place of residence.., and which offers the course of
study pursued by each student. ,, ." The law included sev-
eral exceptions to this general rule, which had the ultimate
effect of permitting bussing for almost any other reason be-
126. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1505 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1503-04. In both Hunter and Washington, the Court looked be-
yond the facially neutral language of the statutes in question to see if, "in real-
ity, the burden imposed by the arrangement necessarily falls on a minority."
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 468 (1982).
129. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1499 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
130. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding
that a statewide initiative intended to prohibit bussing of students to achieve
racial integration in schools is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
131. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
132. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982); see
also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) ("Central ... to our own Con-
stitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government in
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assis-
tance.").
133. Washington, 458 U.S. at 462.
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sides racial diversity in the schools. 134 The Court interpreted
these exceptions as evidence that the "initiative was directed
solely at desegregative bussing in general."' As a result,
Initiative 350 denied minorities the opportunity to achieve
beneficial legislation, and, therefore, discriminated against
them in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 '
This rationale was largely drawn from the Court's prior
holding in Hunter v. Erickson.'37 In this decision, the Court
held that discrimination includes facially neutral legislation
which "distorts governmental processes in such a way as to
place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to
achieve beneficial legislation."'38 However, the mere fact that
a law may "make it more difficult for minorities to achieve
favorable legislation," is not alone sufficient to deem it legally
discriminatory.3 9  State actions which go further, however,
"by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to deter-
mine the decisionmaking process," are unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory.4 ° They make "it more difficult for certain racial
and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their
interest" in much the same way as blatantly denying minori-
ties the vote did.'
14
Judge Henderson's opinion in Coalition for Economic
Equity v. Wilson noted that "Proposition 209 shares several
characteristics with the measures struck down in Hunter and
Seattle." As he explained,
[a]ll three initiatives are facially neutral. All three grew
from controversial efforts aimed at rolling back legislative
gains that were intended as remedies for historical dis-
crimination suffered by particular groups. Perhaps most
134. Id. at 457. For example, under Initiative 350, school boards could re-
quire bussing for health or safety concerns, special needs of students, inade-
quate facilities, and overcrowded or unsafe conditions. Id.
135. Id. at 463. In its analysis, the Court noted that the language of Initia-
tive 350 was facially neutral, but, nonetheless, reaffirmed that "there is little
doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial purposes." Id. at 471.
136. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982).
137. Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (holding that an Akron, Ohio
city charter amendment requiring that all fair housing ordinances be put to a
citywide vote before they could take effect is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
138. Washington, 458 U.S. at 470.
139. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395.
140. Washington, 458 U.S. at 470.
141. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386-91.
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importantly, in the wake of all three measures, those see-
ing to reenact such remedies could no longer use the same
political mechanisms that had been available prior to the
142passage of the enactments.
Given these similarities, Judge Henderson applied the
precedent to Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, and
found that Proposition 209 creates a race and gender
classification. 43 The court then applied an intermediate
scrutiny test to the classification, 4 and concluded that the
alleged state interests in ending discrimination and in
avoiding liability under the 14th Amendment for affirmative
action programs that have not yet been tested in court," are
not sufficient justifications for "the nonneutral reordering of
the political process that is at issue in this case." '
The district court also agreed that plaintiffs'
"demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that
Proposition 209 violates the Supremacy Clause because it
conflicts with, and is preempted by, Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act." 4  The court relied on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") Guidelines on Title VII
and supporting case law for the principle that "Congress in-
tended to protect employers' discretion [to use] race- gender-
conscious affirmative action as a method of complying with
their obligations under Title VII."147 Similarly, the plain lan-
guage and legislative history of Title VII led Henderson to
conclude that "Congress intended the persons or entities po-
tentially liable under Title VII to be entrusted with the power
to avail themselves of the safe passage provided by voluntary
142. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1501 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
143. Coalition, 946 F. Supp. at 1510. The court concluded "that the initiative
'plainly rests on distinctions based on race."' Id. at 1508 (quoting Washington
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982)).
144. Id. at 1509. The intermediate scrutiny test, used in gender classifica-
tion case analyses, requires "that the challenged classification 'serves important
governmental objectives' and that the means employed are 'substantially re-
lated to the achievement of those objectives."' Coalition, 946 F. Supp. at 1509
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996)).
145. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1509 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
146. Id. at 1517. The court, however, rejected the claim that CCRI was also
preempted by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. Id. at 1517-19.
147. Id. at 1517.
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affirmative action.""8 The court found that Proposition 209
"contravenes" Congress' intent in both respects, and was,
therefore, unconstitutional. "'
On January 3, 1997, the district court's ruling in Coali-
tion for Economic Equity v. Wilson was appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.5 °  A three-judge panel unanimously overturned
Judge Henderson's opinion, holding "that, as a matter of law,
Proposition 209 does not violate the United States Constitu-
tion." '5 As such, the Ninth Circuit vacated "the preliminary
injunction, [denied] the motion to stay the injunction as moot,
and [remanded] to district court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion."
15
According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court was
mistaken to rely on the precedents set forth in Washington v.
Seattle School District No. 11s and in Hunter v. Erikson.
5 4
For the Seattle-Hunter doctrine to apply, "the state somehow
must reallocate political authority in a discriminatory man-
ner.""'55 Whereas both Seattle and Hunter involved such real-
location of political power, the Ninth Circuit was unable to
say the same for Proposition 209.' " As the court explained,
CCRI differs from the Seattle ordinance in that it:
addresses in neutral-fashion race-related and gender-
related matters" It does not isolate race or gender antidis-
crimination laws from any specific area over which the
state has delegated authority to a local entity. Nor does it
treat race and gender antidiscrimination laws in one area
148. Id.
149. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1517 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
150. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22955 (Aug. 21, 1997). The defendant class also moved to stay the
district court's injunction pending appeal at that time. Id. A three judge panel
heard oral argument on the motion to stay on February 10, 1997. Id. "On Feb-
ruary 10, 1997, [the panel] heard oral argument on the application for a stay.
The parties' arguments for and against a stay pending appeal focused primarily
on the merits underlying the preliminary injunction itself. [The panel] thus de-
ferred submission of the stay application and expedited submission on the
merits." Id. at *12.
151. Id. at *52-*53.
152. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22955 at *53 (Aug. 21, 1997).
153. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
154. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
155. Coalition, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22955 at *37.
156. See id. at *36-*47.
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differently from race and gender discrimination laws in
another. Rather, it prohibits all race and gender prefer-
ences by state entities.'57
The court, therefore, held that Seattle and Hunter are
completely irrelevant to the case at bar.
158
The Ninth Circuit also argued that even if the court were
to concede that CCRI does restructure the political process,
the initiative would still be constitutional. 9 According to the
court, "[elven a state law that does restructure the political
process can only deny equal protection if it burdens an indi-
vidual's right to equal treatment.""' Although plaintiffs ar-
gued that CCRI imposes a tremendous burden on those who
would seek race and gender preferences, the Ninth Circuit
held that such a burden is already imposed by the Constitu-
tion itself.6' Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit panel stated
"[t]hat the Constitution permits the rare race-based or gen-
der-based preference hardly implies that the state cannot ban
them altogether. States are free to make or not make any
constitutionally permissible legislative classification.' 62
The appellate court concluded its analysis of the equal
protection issue by analogizing Coalition for Economic Equal-
ity v. Wilson to Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of
Los Angeles. 63 "As in Crawford, 'it would be paradoxical to
conclude that by adopting the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the State thereby had
violated it.""64 Thus, the court held that the district court's
analysis of the equal protection claim "relied on an erroneous
legal premise."'
The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court was
wrong to conclude that Proposition 209 violates the Suprem-
acy Clause of the Constitution.'66 According to the appellate
157. Id. at *41.
158. Id. at *36.
159. Id. at *41-*47.
160. Id. at *41.
161. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22955 at *44 (Aug. 21, 1997).
162. Id. at *45.
163. Id. at *46.
164. Id. at *47, n.18 (quoting Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Los An-
geles, 458 U.S. 527, 535 (1982)).
165. Id. at *47.
166. Id. at *48-*49.
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court, the plain language of Title VII "does not preempt
Proposition 209."' 67 Section 708 of Title VII provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or
relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or
punishment provided by any present or future law of any
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any
such la which purports to require or permit the doing of
any act which would be an unlawful employment practice
under this subchapter.
168
According to the court, CCRI does not necessitate any act
which would qualify as an "unlawful employment practice"
under Title VII."'6 9 Thus, "the district court relied on an
erroneous legal premise in concluding that plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on the merits of their preemption claims.
Finally, on November 3, 1997, the United States Su-
preme Court, without comment, denied the petition for the
writ of certiorari submitted by the Coalition for Economic
Equality.17 ' Thus, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Coalition
stands as the law in California.
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The passage of CCRI has sparked a great deal of contro-
versy throughout California and across the nation.72 The ini-
tiative has raised a plethora of social issues which can only
be fully understood and appreciated in light of the turbulent
history of affirmative action. Similarly, as the contrast be-
tween Judge Henderson's district court opinion in Coalition
for Economic Equality v. Wilson and the subsequent Ninth
Circuit opinion demonstrates, the debate over the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action is far from over, despite the
U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to hear the case. This comment
seeks to delve into the public policy and constitutional con-
cerns at the heart of the Proposition 209 debate, and to ad-
167. Coalition, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22955 at *50.
168. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at *52.
171. No. 97-369, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6506 (Nov. 3, 1997).
172. See Phil Garcia, Prop. 209 Foes' Ad Says It Would "Strip" Gains from
Women, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 3, 1996, at A4; see also Boxall, supra note 100,
at A3; Both Sides With Jesse Jackson (CNN Television Broadcast, Nov. 10,
1996), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
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dress the issue of whether an initiative banning race- and
gender-based programs in public hiring, contracting, and
education is an appropriate moral and constitutional re-
sponse to the problems of racism and segregation in America.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Public Policy Concerns
Close scrutiny of the California Civil Rights Initiative
demonstrates that it is flawed. Neither precedent nor the
history of affirmative action support CCRI. While it is true
that discrimination based solely on skin color is contrary to
the purpose of the civil rights laws, CCRI does not reestab-
lish this goal by creating "a more level playing field," as pro-
ponents contend.'73 Instead, it sets women and minorities
back several decades by ignoring the inherent benefits of af-
firmative action programs.
Affirmative action programs were originally created to
assist in the achievement of social and economic equality
among all Americans.'74 Over thirty years later, the benefits
of such programs have survived, and are even continuing to
make a difference in the quality of life for many minorities
and women in the United States. For example, affirmative
action programs are still a means of economic compensation
for the past discrimination against women and minorities
have endured, as well as compensation for the discrimination
such individuals continue to endure on a day to day basis.
Similarly, affirmative action programs can be seen as com-
pensation for a merit system that is primarily based on the
values of white males. Additionally, such programs promote
diversity, which benefits everyone, regardless of skin color or
gender.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's decision to uphold
CCRI and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari ignore the
positive effects affirmative action programs can have on
women and minorities. As a result, California has become
not only "color-blind," but "race and color ignorant.' 75
173. Brandon, supra note 97, at A24.
174. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 1.
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a. Distributive Justice
The Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court,
by its silence, have failed to address the negative effects that
the Initiative will have on distributive justice in California.
Through time, racism and discrimination have created a sys-
tem of economic inequality.'76 Women and minorities have
been "relegated to the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder
because of their race or sex," and the only way to alleviate
this injustice is to give these groups an unqualified chance to
succeed. 7 ' Affirmative action programs create "a new social
reality-one which more nearly resembles the one captured
by the good society ... in which the places of significance will
be held to a substantially greater degree than they are at
present by persons who are nonwhite and female."'78
It is an unfortunate fact that women and minorities are
more likely to be unemployed and in the lower economic
brackets than are white males.9 While there are multiple
reasons for this phenomenon, the role of employment dis-
crimination, education, and work experience must not be un-
derestimated. 8 ° Those with fewer resources often have less
of an opportunity to receive quality primary and secondary
education.' The result is that instead of attending college,
which could propel them out of poverty, many lower income
high-school graduates must immediately enter into the work
force where they are relegated to jobs in which they receive
little compensation.' Affirmative action programs target
those women and minorities that are stuck in the poverty cy-
cle, and often provide them with an opportunity to succeed.
b. Present Discrimination
Affirmative action programs also benefit society by giv-
ing job and educational opportunities to capable individuals
who would otherwise be susceptible to race- and gender-
176. See GREENE, supra note 24, at 9.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting RICHARD WASSERSTORM, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES:
FIVE STUDIES 55 (1980)).
179. CLARENCE PENDLETON & DOUGLAS HURON, The Legal Dimensions of
Affirmative Action, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 7, 10 (Donald Altschiller ed., 1991).
180. GREENE, supra note 24, at 9-11.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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based discrimination. 18 3 Past discrimination against minori-
ties and women has created a society so deeply rooted in ra-
cism and sexism that these trends have carried through to
modern practice. 84 Despite the belief that "[miost Americans
are not racists,""18 hate crimes and other acts stemming from
racism still occur at an alarming rate.186
The truth is that prejudice still emanates from every
pore of modern-day America."7 How else can we explain the
senseless death of Chinese-American Vincent Chen,'88 the
continued burning of crosses on lawns of African-Americans
and Jews, 8 ' and the destruction of African-American
churches in the South?9 ' Americans are not all color-blind;
many are still largely racist. 9' Affirmative action programs
seek to provide those persons most susceptible to racially mo-
tivated discrimination with some sort of compensation. 92 By
ignoring both past and present sexual and racial discrimina-
tion, CCRI denies the opportunity to women and minorities,
in effect, serving to make them more susceptible to racism
and sexism in America.
1 93
"Racism" is not, however, limited to overt acts of racism
such as those mentioned above. It also includes subconscious
racist comments and actions which cause stigma or humilia-
tion to a person because of the color of his or her skin.'94 Ex-
amples include a Caucasian national broadcaster who calls
an African-American professional football player a "little
monkey" during a televised game; 9' a Caucasian man who
183. McAllister, supra note 31, at 24.
184. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck-
ening with Unconscious Racism, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 235. (Kimberlee Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
185. Mark Cohen, Proposition 209's Political Fallout, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1996, at B7.
186. John Heilprin, Unity Against Racism, POST AND COURIER, Nov. 1, 1996,
at B1.
187. Lawrence, supra note 184, at 235.
188. See Habari Njeri, The Turning Point, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1989, at F1
(recalling the brutal killing of Vincent Chen, the "Chinese-American who was
mistaken for a Japanese by white auto workers in Michigan.").
189. Heilprin, supra note 186.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Lawrence, supra note 184, at 235.
193. Garcia, supra note 172.
194. Id.
195. Lawrence, supra note 184, at 240 (quoting a remark made by Howard
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comments to an Asian-American woman that he does not
think of her as being "Asian;"'9' or a Caucasian man who pur-
posely crosses the street so as to avoid walking by a group of
African-Americans. 9 7 Such instances of subconscious racism,
coupled with occasional intentional acts of discrimination,
have a profoundly negative effect on the way minority men,
women, and children view the world around them.9 Thus, to
help counter the ignorance belying overt and subtle instances
of racial and sexual discrimination, it is important to ensure
that women and minorities are adequately represented in the
workforce and educational system.'99
Admittedly, Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
do offer relief to those who actually suffer present-day dis-
crimination on the basis of race or gender. 9° The extent of
this relief, however, is dependent on the effectiveness and
costs of the remedies Titles VI and VII provide. 0 ' Unfortu-
nately, proving discrimination under these statutes is not al-
ways easy.20 2 It typically requires a strong showing of intent
to discriminate-an element that is not always readily ascer-
tainable.2 °3 As a result, it is exceedingly difficult for many
victims of discrimination to seek redress in the court sys-
tem.0 4 Yet, so long as the courts make it exceedingly difficult
for a victim of racial or sexual discrimination to prove injus-
tice, there should be a place for affirmative action programs
in our society.0 '
c. Merit System
The Ninth Circuit's decision to uphold Proposition 209
and the Supreme Court's refusal to hear the case ignore the
fact that affirmative action is a means by which society can
compensate for the imposition of a system of merit that fails
Cosell in 1983 national broadcast).
196. Id. at 240, 241. Lawrence believes that statements like this demon-
strate self-conscious ethnocentrism. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 236.
199. GREENE, supra note 24, at 4-8.
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994); see also §§ 2000e-5(g), 5(k) (1994).
201. McAllister, supra note 31, at 24-25.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 21-24.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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to recognize that different genders and races have different
values and social practices."6 The modern concept of merit is
based on white male values-especially those pertaining to
academic and scholastic achievement." ' An example of this
is found in the American and European legal educational sys-
tems, where the importance of test scores and grades is
heavily stressed."' Like most existing societal institutions,
the educational system was created by Caucasian men at a
time when it was acceptable to exclude African-American,
Asian-American, or other minority cultures from schools.0 9
As a result, it is void of other culture and gender-based val-
ues.210 Often, the only option minorities have if they are to
"succeed" in such a society is to abandon a part of their cul-
ture and, themselves, jump on the white band-wagon.2 1' Af-
firmative action programs give back that piece of culture to
women and minorities that the education system had hereto-
fore ignored.12
Race can be-and often is-as much of an indicator of
who a person is and what he or she is capable of as grades
and test scores are. Race is not just about skin color; it is
also about cultural values that stem from racial differences.2"'
These values are deeply embedded within our souls-they
shape the way minorities and women see the world, and their
place in it. '14
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has recognized that em-
ployers cannot attach certain characteristics to a culture or
206. See GARY PELLER, Race-Consciousness, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 143 (Kimberlee Crenshaw et al.
eds., 1995).
207. Id. According to Peller, any social practice which was created by white
males, for white males, is inherently biased towards majoritarian values and
beliefs. Id. Such systems "can no longer provide a neutral ground from which
to defend existing definitions either of qualifications or of merit," and, there-
fore, must be eradicated. Id.
208. Id. In the educational system-especially higher education-
admissions, hiring, and tenure debates are premised on a merit system that
stresses and rewards excellent grades and test scores. Id.
209. PELLER, supra note 206, at 143.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. NEIL GOTANDA, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
257, 270-71. (Kimberlee Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
214. Id. at 271.
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gender and assume that an individual possesses certain val-
ued traits simply because of his or her skin color. 15 However,
CCRI takes this too far by prohibiting government employers
from recognizing that a specific person may actually embody
certain cultural, racial, or gender characteristics which might
prove invaluable in the office or classroom.16 By embracing a
state constitution that is not only color-blind-but also cul-
turally-blind, CCRI forces state employers and educational
institutions to ignore the value of diversity by subscribing to
a primarily white merit system."' As a result, cultural dif-
ferences are ignored, and minority cultures are forced to
adopt a value system that they did not help create.
d. Diversity
Proposition 209 overlooks the positive effects affirmative
action programs have on society by promoting diversity.218
There is an undeniable value in having a racially and gender
diverse workforce or university community. 9 Persons of dif-
ferent cultures and genders see the world from different per-
spectives. Thus, it is socially desirable to have an environ-
ment where several views are represented.22 ° In a diverse
environment, people will be able to learn about one another's
gender and cultural differences on a personal level, which
will hopefully create an atmosphere of acceptance and under-
standing.22  As one corporate manager explained, "[bly
learning about others we learn about ourselves. In the proc-
ess, individuals become empowered to view differences as as-
sets and to put these assets to work creatively."
215. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1985).
216. PELLER, supra note 206, at 132.
217. See supra part II.A.2.
218. PELLER, supra note 206, at 132.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 132. This is not to say that we should generalize race and gender
such that, for example, all African-Americans are seen as possessing certain
cultural characteristics. Instead, we should merely recognize the potential sig-
nificance of one's culture and gender, and determine on a personal level if an
individual does, in fact, embody certain racial, cultural, or sexual characteris-
tics. Id.
221. Donald Altschiller, The Legal Dimensions of Affirmative Action, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 10, 10 (Donald Altschiller ed., 1991).
222. Id. (quoting Alan Zimmerle, Corporate Manager of Equal Opportunity,
valuing differences and affirmative action at Digital Equipment Corp. in May-
nard, Mass.).
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As the California Civil Rights Initiative stands, minority
cultures and women will be forced to comply with the value
judgments of white males. In place of the individuality that
is central to their identity will be a more acceptable
"whiteness." What the appellate court fails to recognize is
that skin color and race are not interchangeable. Culture
and gender do more than shape what we look like on the out-
side; they also make us who we are on the inside. 223 Thus, an
environment that is culturally and sexually diverse will typi-
cally be composed of individuals who, because of race or gen-
der, see the world through different perspectives.224 Such dif-
ferences facilitate problem solving, and can create "a more
humane and stimulating work environment for all.22 5
In addition, the tendency of people to be attracted to
those who most resemble them must not be overlooked.2 6 If a
university or corporation has racial and gender diversity,
more people will tend to find it a comfortable environment.22 '
Similarly, if there are minorities and women in higher posi-
tions, those in lower positions will feel comfortable going to
them for assistance or advice.228 Such a system of camarade-
rie could certainly improve employee productivity and moti-
vation."9
B. Procedural and Constitutional Concerns
In addition to being flawed with respect to the aforemen-
tioned public policy concerns, the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson also suffers from
several procedural and constitutional infirmities. First, the
three-judge panel which was reviewing Judge Henderson's
District Court decision overstepped the boundaries of their
judicial power by deciding much more than the issue that
was before them. It is well-settled that an order granting a
223. GOTANDA, supra note 213, at 270-71.
224. MARY C. GENTILE, DIFFERENCES THAT WORK: ORGANIZATIONAL
EXCELLENCE THROUGH DIVERSITY at xv (1994).
225. Id. at xiv.
226. See Tounya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of one Black
Woman Law Professor, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 329. (Kimberlee Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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preliminary injunction prior to final judgment is appeal-
able.230 However, the "scope of an appellate court's inquiry is
only to determine whether or not the trial court has abused
its discretion."23' As the court explained in Miller & Lux v.
Madera Canal Co., "[t]he granting or denial of a preliminary
injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate
rights in controversy."" ' Thus, the appellate court may not
determine the merits of the claim before trial.233
The Ninth Circuit was apparently unaware of the limited
scope of its reviewing powers when it decided Coalition for
Economic Equity v. Wilson. The sole issue before the three-
judge panel was whether the District Court abused its discre-
tion by issuing the preliminary injunction on the implemen-
tation of Proposition 209. The appellate court went a step
further, however, by addressing the constitutionality of the
Initiative itself, and holding "that, as a matter of law, Propo-
sition 209 does not violate the United States Constitution."
23 4
At most, the court should have vacated the preliminary in-
junction and remanded the case to the lower court for deter-
mination on the merits. Instead, it may have precluded any
chance for trial that the Initiative had.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Ninth
Circuit did not abuse its discretion by ruling on the merits of
the Initiative, the court's analysis of the constitutional issues
before it suggests a total lack of understanding of the United
States Constitution. The language of the Fourteenth
Amendment suggests that all state laws must apply to citi-
zens equally. 23' They may not single out certain characteris-
tics for preferential treatment, or deny general benefits to a
specific group. 236 The Ninth Circuit's claim that the Seattle-
Hunter doctrine is inapplicable to a constitutional analysis of
Proposition 209 completely ignores the central meaning be-
hind the theory of "equal protection." It is obvious that the
230. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 904.1 (Deering 1996).
231. Froomer v. Drollinger, 183 7 Cal. Rptr. 268, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
232. Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal Co., 99 P. 502, 505 (Cal. 1907).
233. Environmental Coalition of Orange County, Inc. v. AVCO Community
Developers, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
234. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-14031, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22955, *52-*53 (Aug. 21, 1997).
235. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
236. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 75 (1992).
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Ninth Circuit was willing to stop at nothing-not even the
parameters of the United States Constitution-to uphold the
California Civil Rights Initiative.
1. Fourteenth Amendment
By holding that Proposition 209 does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, the panel of Ninth Circuit justices
completely overlooked relevant Supreme Court precedent. As
Judge Henderson explained in his district court decision,
both Washington v. Seattle School District Number 1... and
Hunter v. Erickson218 stand for the proposition that the gov-
ernment may not pass legislation that makes it exceedingly
more difficult for a particular group of individuals to use the
political process to gain laws in their favor. 9 Such legisla-
tion "reallocate[s] political authority in a discriminatory
manner,"24° and is, therefore, not tolerated by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2 4
'
The District Court relied heavily on the similarities be-
tween these cases and the Proposition 209 case when it de-
cided to issue a preliminary injunction banning implementa-
tion of the Initiative.242 Like the ordinances at issue in both
Seattle and Hunter, CCRI is not blatantly discriminatory.
Nonetheless, it still places an immense burden on women
and minorities by making it impossible to pass legislation in
their favor, or to implement programs that recognize racial
and gender differences. 43
The Ninth Circuit saw this effect "not as an impediment
to protection against unequal treatment but as an impedi-
ment to receiving preferential treatment."2 44 As the appellate
court explained:
Impediments to preferential treatment do not deny equal
protection. It is one thing to say that individuals have
237. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
238. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
239. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1505 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
240. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-14031, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22955, *52-*53 (Aug. 21, 1997).
241. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982).
242. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1505 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
243. Id. at 1489.
244. Coalition, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22955 at *43.
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equal protection rights against political obstructions to
equal treatment; it is quite another to say that individuals
have equal protection rights against political obstructions
to preferential treatment. While the Constitution protects
against obstructions to equal treatment, it erects obstruc-
tions to preferential treatment by its own terms.246
Such reasoning completely ignores the legal significance
of Seattle and Hunter. Proposition 209 is not about ending
discrimination, as the panel would have us believe. The Ini-
tiative does not, after all, prohibit all forms of discrimination
and preferential treatment-just that based on race and gen-
der.246 State educational systems and employers are still
permitted to give preferential treatment to athletes, Califor-
nia residents, students with disabilities, children of alumnus,
and single-parent children.247 Despite the passage of Proposi-
tion 209, a college can choose to admit an all-star football
player with a high school grade point average of 2.0 (on a 4.0
scale), over an oboe player with a high school grade point av-
erage of 3.5. Such preferential treatment is more than just
suggestive of discrimination.
Apparently, the drafters of Proposition 209 and the
Ninth Circuit believe such "characteristics" say something
"about the content of a person's character," which race does
not. 48 Such logic, however, is greatly flawed. Just as not all
minorities share the same character traits in the same way,
not all athletes, single-parent children, or legacies are exactly
alike. 49 Nonetheless, the government still permits state edu-
cational systems and employers to group such people to-
gether and to discriminate against those individuals who are
not athletically inclined, do not have divorced parents, orwhose parents never went to college. 50
This analysis suggests that affirmative action programs
are, in fact, an issue of special interest to minorities in much
245. Id.
246. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1505 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
247. Id.
248. Both Sides With Jesse Jackson (CNN Television Broadcast, Nov. 10,
1996), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
249. Id.
250. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1505 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
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the same way that racial bussing was found to be in Seattle.251
This is further substantiated by the fact that those persons
most affected by Proposition 209 are the ones outraged by its
passage.252 The consensus seems to be that those most af-
fected by CCRI believe affirmative action is necessary to their
receipt of equal protection of the laws.5 3 Perhaps we should
listen to the victims instead of insisting that only white ma-
joritarian views be voiced.
The Seattle analysis suggests that the California Civil
Rights Initiative is indeed unconstitutional on equal protec-
tion grounds.254 Since its holding in 1982, however, the com-
position of the Court has dramatically changed.255 As the
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena256 and City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co. 25 holdings suggest, the Supreme Court is
much less sympathetic today to the plight of minorities and
women than it was when it decided Seattle.258 The majority
opinions in Adarand and Richmond were, however, quite
narrow, which might have suggested that the Court would
now be ready to reevaluate affirmative action and its place in
society.29 But since the Court has refused to grant certiorari
to Coalition v. Wilson,26° the valid concerns regarding the
constitutionality of Proposition 209 may not be addressed for
years.
For instance, San Francisco has openly vowed to defy the
law with respect to Proposition 209.26 ' But even those Cali-
fornia public entities who want to make a good faith effort to
251. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982).
252. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 (N.D.
Cal. 1996); see also Both Sides With Jesse Jackson (CNN Television Broadcast,
Nov. 10, 1996), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
253. Both Sides With Jesse Jackson (CNN Television Broadcast, Nov. 10,
1996), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
254. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1509 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (holding that "plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of success
on the merits of their equal protection claim.").
255. Linda Chavez, Winds of Change, RECORDER, Nov. 13, 1996, at 5.
256. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
257. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
258. Chavez, supra note 255.
259. Chavez, supra note 255.
260. 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
261. Louis Freedberg, Agencies Say They'll Ignore Prop. 209 Ban on Prefer-
ences Starts on Day of Protest March, S.F. CHRON., August 28, 1997, at Al,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Sfchrn File; see also Silence of the Court on
Affirmative Action, supra note 16.
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comply with the law "will want to know what tools that they
have to fight discrimination and promote diversity."262 So
even though CCRI stands as the law of the state, many legal
issues remain regarding its implications.
V. PROPOSAL
Since the California Civil Rights Initiative has been de-
clared constitutional, Californians are now faced with the
problem of how to alleviate some of the stress it will un-
doubtedly place on women and minorities. Programs which
have targeted lower income individuals for recruitment in the
educational and employment sectors have certainly received
the economic benefits of affirmative action. Unfortunately,
such assistance can no longer be provided. So in order to
reach the past beneficiaries of affirmative action programs,
new strategies for promoting distributive justice must be cre-
ated.
For instance, at public colleges and universities in Cali-
fornia, admissions officers could follow the example of many
private schools, including Santa Clara University, Stanford
University, University of Notre Dame, Cornell University,
and Harvard University. Admissions committees could in-
clude questions in their applications which ask applicants to
identify how their past experiences have shaped who they
are. Such questions are open-ended enough to permit stu-
dents to write about the ways their culture personally influ-
enced them, or how they were discriminated against on the
basis of race or gender, and the impact such discrimination
had on them.
The same method of questioning could also be imposed
by employers in interviews. CCRI does not make it unlawful
to ask potential employees what life experiences have most
shaped who they are. Nor does it make it unlawful to hire
someone because their life experiences would add an unique
perspective to the organization.
VI. CONCLUSION
The California Civil Rights Initiative may have resulted
from an honest effort on the part of Californians to place all
262. Silence of the Court on Affirmative Action, supra note 16, at A20.
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state residents on an equal playing ground.263 Unfortunately,
such a goal is not socially or constitutionally feasible.6 4 In a
world where color and gender are still the basis of much hate,
violence, and discrimination, it is necessary to have appro-
priate remedies at our disposal.265 CCRI strips Californians
of such remedies, and ignores the importance of race and di-
versity in state educational systems and employment.6
Since its inception, affirmative action has always been a
controversial issue.6 ' It is not easy to ascertain when and
how affirmative action should be implemented, or to gage the
effectiveness of current programs.268 Nonetheless, affirmative
action programs do provide a plethora of benefits to modern
society-benefits which are obliterated by the passage of
Proposition 209.69 Instead of a world of equality and diver-
sity, we are left with a colorless world.
Rebecca Smith
263. BLOCK, supra note 97.
264. See supra discussion Part IV.
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268. McAllister, supra note 31, at 24.
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